All systems operational Ed25519 · KMS

Audit-grade receipts for AI voice agents.

When an AI bot calls a consumer on behalf of a brand, Adjuro issues a signed receipt, proving who the agent is, what consent authorized the call, and on whose behalf. Verifiable by anyone in under 50 milliseconds.

From the Latin adjurō/ad·YOO·roh/“I attest under oath.”

Start free, 100 receipts, no card Request early access Read the protocol

Live in production today · open-source verifier · pre-revenue, and looking for our first design partners.

Mint PROTOCOL A signed receipt before connect Verify PROTOCOL Confirm any agent in <50ms

SIGNED

consent-receipt.json Ed25519

{
  "agent_id":      "adj:7k9n2p4f8m1q5w3r",
  "brand":         "Acme Collections",
  "callee_hash":   "sha256:7c4f…e2a1",
  "consent_id":    "crm-12847-consent",
  "scope":         ["debt_collection"],
  "jurisdiction":  "US-CA",
  "issued_at":     "2026-05-30T00:00:00Z",
  "kid":           "adjuro-root-2026w23"
}

Trust registry

Checking…

Verify latency p99

47 ms

V0 endpoints live

Test suite

300 / 300

Production cryptography, open from day one

EdDSA · Ed25519 AWS KMS · HSM-backed Transparency log FRE 901 chain of custody adjuro · Apache 2.0

I The Receipt

A signed JWS, built for the courtroom, and verifiable anywhere.

Every Adjuro receipt is a JOSE-standard JWS signed with pure Ed25519 (RFC 8032) inside an AWS KMS HSM. Each field proves a specific claim, and the signature over them is unforgeable without HSM-backed key access. Any third party verifies it independently, no call to Adjuro required.

Who & on whose behalf
agent_id and brand bind the AI agent to the legal entity that placed the call.
What consent authorized it
consent_id and scope reference the capture record and constrain the legal purpose.
Recipient, without the PII
callee_hash is an HMAC of the E.164, attests the consumer at call time without revealing the number.

consent-receipt.json SIGNED ✓

{
  "iss": "https://api.adjuro.ai",
  "jti": "adj_rcpt_x9k2tqp4f7a3w1n5b8c2d6e3",
  "iat": 1780099200,
  "exp": 2095459200,
  "agent_id": "adj:7k9n2p4f8m1q5w3r6t2y8u4i",
  "tenant_id": "acme-collections-mid-atlantic",
  "brand": "Acme Collections",
  "brand_verified": true,
  "trust_tier": "verified",
  "trust_root_id": "adjuro-root-sample",
  "event_type": "voice_call",
  "caller_number": "+18005551212",
  "callee_hash": "sha256-hmac:a8j1bzs9c5y2v7m6p4n3f8d2",
  "campaign_id": "acct-recovery-q2-2026",
  "consent_id": "crm-12847-consent-2026-03-14",
  "scope": ["debt_collection"],
  "jurisdiction": "US-CA",
  "issued_at": "2026-05-30T00:00:00.000Z",
  "expires_at": "2036-05-27T00:00:00.000Z"
}

Verify latency p99

47 ms

Signature size

64 bytes

Algorithm

EdDSA · Ed25519

Key custody

AWS KMS · us-east-1

II Evidence Packets

Win the motion with a packet, not a screenshot.

When discovery comes, export a self-contained evidence bundle for any call, signed receipt, historical keys at time of issuance, and an integrity manifest. Designed for FRE 901 chain-of-custody without an expert witness to explain a hash.

One API call, one ZIP
Pull a complete audit packet for any receipt id, no CRM archaeology.
Provable at time of issuance
Historical JWKS shows the receipt was valid when minted, years later.
Tamper-evident manifest
A signed manifest.json seals the whole packet against alteration.

audit-packet.zip FRE 901

# GET /v1/calls/adj_rcpt_x9k2…/evidence

audit-packet.zip
├── metadata.json            # receipt + verifier log
├── receipts/
│   └── <id>.jws            # signed receipt
├── jwks-at-issuance.json    # historical keys
├── README.txt
├── manifest.json
└── manifest.json.sig        # packet integrity

Day-1 verifications

6 / 6

Test suite

300 tracked ✓

V0 endpoints live

Pure Ed25519

RFC 8032

Compliance teams shouldn’t reconstruct consent from CRM screenshots. They should hold a signature.

The case for cryptographic receipts

III The compliance bomb of 2025

$6.6M

Average TCPA class-action settlement in 2024–2025. Federal filings grew 60% year-over-year, and roughly 80% are class actions. The Lowery v. OpenAI / Twilio suit now exposes platforms to $500–$1,500 per call for downstream consent failures.

Sources Womble Bond Dickinson · CompliancePoint · ActiveProspect · Lowery v. OpenAI / Twilio

2,628

TCPA federal cases in 2025 · 60% YoY growth

~80%

Filed as class actions

$500–1.5K

Platform exposure per call · Lowery v. OpenAI / Twilio

10–40 hrs

Compliance time per discovery request

Where we are today

Adjuro is live in production and pre-revenue. The signing, verification, transparency log, and open-source SDK are real and running right now, you can verify a receipt in your browser on this page, and inspect the public log yourself. We’re looking for our first design partners now. If you’re carrying TCPA exposure on AI voice today, we want to build the integration with you, and we’d rather earn your trust by showing you the proofs than by showing you a logo wall we haven’t earned yet.

IV How it works

Three calls. Sign at issue. Verify offline. Export the packet.

Drop Adjuro into an existing call flow in an afternoon. The verifier is open source, so anyone can confirm a receipt without an Adjuro account.

A · Issue

Before each outbound call, your app asks Adjuro to sign a receipt binding the agent, the consent reference, and the call metadata.

# POST /v1/consent-receipts
curl -X POST https://api.adjuro.ai/v1/consent-receipts \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $ADJURO_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{ "agent_id": "adj:7k9n2p4f8m1q5w3r",
       "brand": "Acme Collections",
       "consent_id": "crm-12847",
       "scope": ["debt_collection"],
       "jurisdiction": "US-CA",
       "nonce": "a1b2c3d4e5f60718" }'

# → 201 { "receipt_id": "adj_rcpt_x9k2…", "receipt_jws": "eyJh…",
#         "verify_token": "…", "status": "pending" }

B · Verify

Any third party, a contact center, a law firm, opposing counsel, verifies the signature against the published JWKS. Offline once the JWKS is cached.

// npm install adjuro
import { verifyReceipt } from "adjuro";

const result = await verifyReceipt(receiptJws);

// → { valid: true, kid: "adjuro-root-2026w23",
//      receipt_id: "adj_rcpt_x9k2…",
//      payload: { agent_id: "adj:7k9n…", scope: ["debt_collection"] } }

C · Export

For discovery, audit, or a motion to dismiss: the receipt, the JWKS at time of issuance, and packet metadata, bundled into a signed ZIP.

# GET /v1/calls/:receipt_id/evidence
curl https://api.adjuro.ai/v1/calls/adj_rcpt_x9k2…/evidence \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $ADJURO_KEY" -o evidence.zip

unzip -l evidence.zip
# metadata.json
# receipts/adj_rcpt_x9k2….jws
# jwks-at-time-of-issuance.json
# manifest.json + manifest.json.sig

Don’t take the agent’s word for it, verify it. Runs in your browser, no account needed.

Sample receipt (editable), signed at build time with a real Ed25519 key

Watch the roundtrip

AI voice call → Adjuro receipt → verified.

adjuro-demo.mp4 2 MIN

2 MIN · AI VOICE OUTBOUND CALL → ADJURO RECEIPT → VERIFY ROUNDTRIP

V Why Adjuro

Built for the receipt to outlive the company that issued it.

The hard part of trust infrastructure isn't issuing a token; it's proving it holds up in court, years later, to a party that doesn't trust you. Adjuro is engineered around that.

Built for FRE 901 evidence

HSM-backed signatures plus the JWKS at time of issuance give you chain of custody by construction, designed to stand up under FRE 901 (admissibility is always the court's call).

FRE 901 · pure Ed25519

Sub-50ms verification

Any third party verifies a receipt independently, no round-trip to Adjuro required.

47ms p99

Federated trust network

The verifier accepts any operator's signing root, not just ours. Adjuro runs the registry; additional roots are reserved and open for other platforms to operate their own.

adjuro-root · open to any operator

Open-source SDK

The verifier is published to npm under Apache 2.0. No vendor lock-in, by design.

npm · adjuro

Public transparency log

Receipts are designed to append to a tamper-evident log with Merkle inclusion proofs anyone can check.

log.adjuro.ai · live

HSM-backed signing

Keys live in AWS KMS and are never exposed in plaintext. Receipts are unforgeable without HSM access.

Ed25519 · KMS

VI Security & trust

The receipt is the proof, even if Adjuro disappears.

Verification needs only the public keys and the open-source SDK. Your evidence doesn't depend on us staying online, and your work never trains a shared model.

EdDSA

Ed25519, HSM-backed via AWS KMS

100%

Receipts designed for the public log

Plaintext key exposure

Apache 2.0

Open verifier · independent audit

In regulated industries, an AI agent’s word isn’t evidence. Adjuro is.

Sixty-minute integration with an open SDK. Bring a real call flow, and we'll mint and verify a receipt against it live.

Request early access See the Transparency Log

The trust infrastructure, by the numbers

Day-1 verifications
complete

6 / 6

VOICE WEBHOOK + KMS · 2026-05-17

V0 endpoints live

JWKS · DID · AGENTS · CONSENT-RECEIPTS · API-RECEIPTS · RECEIPTS · REVOCATIONS · VERIFY · CALL-EVENTS · CALLS · TRANSPARENCY-LOG · AUTH · TENANTS

Test suite

307 tracked

BUN TEST · MAIN · 67 FILES

Transparency log

LIVE

LOG.ADJURO.AI · SINCE 2026-06-07

OSS verifier SDK

v1.1.0

NPM · ADJURO · APACHE-2.0 · 2026-06-08

Production cryptography

Ed25519 · KMS

VERIFIED 2026-05-17